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1. DELIMITATION OF THE PROBLEM: THE ApPLICATION OF Ht:~tAN RIGHTS
PRESCRIPTIONS
It is particularly opportune that this centenary meeting of the Interna-
tional Law Association should focus attention upon the protection of
human rights at a time when it is increasingly recognized that there is a
human rights dimension to every human interaction and every authorita-
tive decision. The task that I propose for myself in our program, in supple-
ment to the many important statements about particular authoritative
prescriptions and about "structures or institutional arrangements" de-
signed better to promote and protect human rights, is that of inquiring into
the possibilities of improving our intellectual procedures for the detailed
clarification and specification of the substantive content of human rights
in specific instances of application.' The best formulated prescriptions
may be but illusion, and the best designed structures or institutional ar-
rangements may be but castles upon the sands, if the persons making
important community decisions do not understand the basic purposes of
* Copyright retained by Myres S. McDougal. This paper was presented at the centenlU)'
celebration of the International Law Association in Brussels on August 30. 1973. It \\ill
eventually appear also in a centenary volume of the Association. The paper draws upon
collaborative studies in association with Lung·chu Chen. Harold D. Lasswell. and W. Michael
Reisman. The writer is especially indebted to Dr. Chen for assistance in the preparation of
this paper and its appendices.
The Ralph Ogden Foundation has been generous in its support of the studies from which
this statement is drawn.
** Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School. B.A.• 1925. M.A.• 1926, LL.B.• 1935. Univ.
of Mississippi; B.A. (Juris.). 1929. B.C.L.• 1930. Oxford; J.S.D., 1931. Yale Low School;
L.H.D., 1954, Columbia; LL.D.• 1966. Northwestern.
1. This allocation of effort is inspired by Professor John P. Humphrey's insightful study.
The International Law of Human Rights in the Middle Tu'entieth Century. in TUE PRESE.'"T
STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER EssAYS (M. Bos ed. 1973). from which the quoted
words are taken.
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the prescriptions and structures and how to relate such purposes to specific
instances of choice.
It has been many times observed how the early, rudimentary demands
for physical security and inviolability of the person, with freedom from
arbitrary restraint and cruel and inhumane punishments-for liberty in its
most primitive sense-have burgeoned, through related demands for free-
doms of opinion and expression, of conscience and worship, and of meeting
and association, into a comprehensive insistence today by most of the
peoples of the world upon a full and rich participation in all the basic
c.ommunity value processes upon which more rudimentary rights depend.2
Different peoples located in different parts of the world, and conditioned
by varying cultural traditions, do of course assert these more fundamental
demands in many different nuances of institutional practice and modality;
but there is an overriding insistence, transcending all cultures and climes,
upon the greater production and wider distribution of all basic values, with
increasing recognition that a world public order of human dignity can
tolerate wide differences in the specific practices by which values are
shaped and shared, so long as all demands and practices are effectively
appraised and accommodated in terms of common interest.3 Similarly,
different peoples, conditioned by different philosophical and ideological
traditions, do offer different justifications or logical derivations in support
of their demands. The contemporary movement for human rights upon the
world scene would appear to be heir to all the earlier great, though more
partial, historic movements for man's freedom (in Europe, the Americas,
and elsewhere) and to the enduring elements in most of the world's great
religions and secular philosophies, most especially those ofnatural law and
natural rights and of contemporary science with its findings about the deep
interrelations of simple respect for the dignity of the person and all other
values. Yet, again, there is growing awareness that, when different syntac-
tic justifications converge upon the same empirical reference to all the
basic rights of men, an intellectual tolerance for differences in styles of
justification and derivation can only increase the likelihood of a wider
2. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1950); C.W. JENKS, LAW, FREE-
DOM AND WELFARE (1963); Waldock, Human Rights in Contemporary International Law and
the Significance of the European Convention, in BRITISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE LAW, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (Int'I L. Series No.5,
1965); Castberg, Natural Law and Human Rights: An Idea-Historical Survey, in
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 13 (A. Eide & A. Schou eds. 1968); McDougal
& Leighton, The Rights of Man in the World Community: Constitutional Illusions versus
Rational Action, 59 YALE L.J. 60 (1949), reprinted in M. McDOUGAL & Assoc., STUDIES IN
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 335 (1960).
3. McDougal & Bebr, Human Rights in the United Nations, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 603 (1964);
C.W. JENKS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS (1960); THE RIGHT TO DE A
MAN (UNESCO, J. Hersch ed. 1968).
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realization of basic values, where people are able and willing to cooperate
toward the common goal of the enhanced protection of inescapably shared
rights.4 The important fact is that the peoples of the world are today
increasingly demanding-whatever their differences in cultural traditions,
ideologies, and styles of justification-that all those basic rights. com-
monly characterized in empirical references as those of human dignity, be
secured by the processes of law in all the different communities of which
they are members, including especially the transnational or world com-
munity.s
It is equally common knowledge how a global prescribing or legislative
process, characteristically operating at many different levels of deliberate-
ness and explicitness, has in recent decades transformed all these cumulat-
ing demands of the peoples of the world for human rights into authoritative
general community prescription.6 There has been a vast proliferation of the
most deliberate and explicit prescriptions, designed both to specify the
content of human rights in various categories and to add general com-
munity expectations about authority and control to popular demand.
These include such items as the United Nations Charter itself. the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, the Genocide Convention, the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the European Convention on
Human Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, and a whole host
of other specialized communications of varying purpose and geographic
reach.7 On a more fundamental level, simultaneously with all this deliber-
ate and relatively explicit communication, the more ineluctable processes
of "customary prescription," with their less deliberate and less explicit
formulations, have been operating through the communications from uni-
formities in private behavior and official decision and through the count-
4. McDougal & Bebr, supra note 3. Contemporary attitudes arc well·iIlustrated in the
essays collected in the four volumes of lNn:RNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF Hm.IA.'i RlGlrTS, ItE....t
CASSIN MUCORUM DISCIPULORUMQUE LIBER (1969·72) [hereinafter cited lIS RE..t CASSIS) and
in Essays in Honor of Egon Schwelb, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 194 (1971).
5. Humphrey, The World Revolution in Human Rights, in Hm.1AN RlGlrTS. FEDERALIS!>I "',1>
MINORITIES 147 (A. Gotlieb ed. 1970); Toth, Human Rights and World Peace, in 1 ~"t
CASSIN, supra note 4, at 362; Lasswell, The Interrelations of World Organization and Society,
55 YALE L.J. 889 (1946), reprinted in THE Poucy SCIENCES 102 (D. Lerner & H. Lasswell eds.
1951).
6. A.H. RoBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD (1972); Schwelb, The Intemational Court
of Justice and the Human Rights Clauses of the Charter, 66 MI. J. lr.-T'L L. 337 (1972); A.H.
RoBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE lNn:RNATIONAL COMMUNITY (1964); Sohn. Protection of
Human Rights Through International Legislation, in 1 RE..t CASSIN, supra note 4, at 325.
7. A rich collection of the more important prescriptions is olTered in I. Bnow....w:, BASIC
DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1971).
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less declarations, resolutions, and recommendations of many different
bodies, governmental and non-governmental, which have become a part of
the working expectations of the peoples of the world. It does not seem
unwarranted to observe, as a part of an ongoing global prescribing process,
the emergence and gradual crystallization of a comprehensive "bill of
rights," comparable to that exemplified in the constitutions' of our more
mature national communities, as an integral part of global constitutive
process, however imperfect the other features of that process may be.
lt should further be no cause for surprise that the prescriptions about
human rights emerging from global constitutive process, whether or not
regarded as establishing a comprehensive bill of rights, or ius cogens, are
both complementary in form (in terms of rights protected) and highly
abstract in their particular formulations. Even in mature national com-
munities, constitutive prescriptions project a wide sharing of values among
many participants, through many varied institutional practices, and under
conditions which cannot be anticipated in detail. Complementary formu-
lations, framed at many different levels of abstraction, are indispensable
both to express the whole range of fundamental demands and expectations
and to make tentative identifications of the different factual contexts in
which different distributions of values are demanded and expected.H The
immense flow of prescriptions alluded to above does in fact cover every
phase of human interaction and all demanded values-civil, political, so-
cial, economic, cultural, and other-and in many particular instances of
interaction such values must be in fact competitive, requiring choices
among alternative prescriptions-or alternative interpretations of particu-
lar prescriptions-and protected values.9 The necessities and potentialities
of this complementarity are explicitly recognized in many of the human
rights prescriptions in the form of requirements, first, for the accommoda-
tion of particular human rights with other human rights and the aggregate
common interest, and second, of permissible derogations from some
human rights in times of high crisis and intense threat to aggregate com-
munity interest. The same necessities and potentialities are less explicit,
but no less inherent, in the high level of abstraction or ambiguity with
which all the human rights prescriptions, like most other prescriptions, are
perforce formulated. 1O
8. That the complementarity in legal principle is a necessary correspondence to comple-
mentarity in social process is documented in McDougal, The Ethics 01 Applying Systems 01
Authority: The Balanced Opposites 01 a Legal System, in THE ETHIC OF POWER: THE INTERPLAY
OF RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, AND POLITICS 221 (H. Lasswell & H. Cleveland eds. 1962).
9. The range of values covered in some of the more important prescriptions is indicated in
terms of a convenient categorization (designed to be comprehensive) in ApPENDIX III.
10. See Bilder, Rethinking International Human Rights: Some Basic Questions, 1969 WiS.
L. REV. 171, 179; E-I DAES, Restrictions and Limitations on Human Rights, in 3 R.:NE
CASSIN, supra note 4, at 79; M. CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? at 51 et seq. (1962). It
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The explicit recognition within the human rights prescriptions of the
necessity for accommodating any particular human right with all other
human rights and the aggregate common interest is beautifully illustrated
in two Articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 1I Article 29
reads:
1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free
and full development of his personality is possible.
2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms. everyone shall be
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely
for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the
rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just require-
ments of morality, public order and the general welfare in a dem-
ocratic society.
3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary
to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Article 30 reads:
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for
any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or
to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights
and freedoms set forth herein.
Comparable illustration, in the specification of particular rights. is af-
forded by two articles of the International Covenant on Political and Civil
Rights. Article 21 reads:
The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restric-
tions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those
imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security or public
safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health
or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Article 22 reads:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with
others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the
protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other
may be observed that what are commonly described as "limitations" on human rights are in
fact but accomodations to other human rights.
11. The full texts of the various selections here quoted are readily accessible in BROWSUE,
supra note 7.
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than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary
in a democratic society in the interests of national security or
public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public
health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful
restrictions on members of the armed forces and of the police in
their exercise of this right.
Further illustration could be multiplied from many particular prescrip-
tions in relation to many particular rights. 12
The explicit recognition of the necessity for authorizing derogation from
particular rights in times of high crisis is excellently illustrated in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 4(1) reads:
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the
nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the
States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures dero-
gating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, pro-
vided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other
obligations under international law and do not involve discrimi-
nation solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion
or social origin.
The wording of the European Convention on Human Rights differs
slightly. Article 15(1) reads:
In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life
of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures
derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the ex-
tent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided
that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations
under international law.
It will be noted that both prescriptions impose requirements of necessity
and proportionality, the ascertainment of which must entail examination
of very large factual contexts. 13
The high level of abstraction, or ambiguity, in which the human rights
prescriptions are formulated, if not already sufficiently evident in the
selections quoted above, may be observed as broadcast in all the prescrip-
12. In ApPENDIX IV we offer comprehensive indication of explicit provisions for accomoda·
tions and derogations in a number of important prescriptions.
13. For general discussion of the complexities of the problems of derogation and accomoda.
tion, see A.H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 58,62,69 (1963); J.B.S. FAWCETT, TilE
ApPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 222, 245 (1969); Morrisson,
Margin ofAppreciation in Human Rights Law, 6 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 263 (1973). It will be noted
that the intellectual difficulties in problems of accomodation and derogation are much tho
same, with the latter distinguishable only by the additional fact of alleged community crisis.
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tions. The mere leafing through any collection of these prescriptions must
disclose such terms as "arbitrary," "fair hearing," "inhuman treatment or
punishment," "degrading treatment," "forced or compulsory labour,"
"slavery or servitude," "privacy," "any obligation required by law," "com-
pelling reasons of national security," "prejudice and interests of justice,"
"any propaganda for a war," "the equal protection of the law," "the pro-
tection of morals," "necessary in a democratic society," "public emer-
gency," "threatens the life of the nation," and so on. A distinguished young
Asian scholar has written an entire doctoral thesis for a great law school
on the meaning in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the one
word, "arbitrary," seeking to establish that the word means "unjust"
rather than "illegal"; unhappily, he does not fully recognize that the word
arbitrary is commonly employed to summon up all the complementary
interests to a particular right and, hence, he does not offer us much succor
in attaching a reference to "unjust."11 An older American scholar has made
an exhaustive study of the meaning of "fair hearing" in the international
covenants, attempting as vainly as incestuously to establish the meaning
of one abstract text by reference to other equally abstract texts; it can
scarcely be grounds for forgiveness that the method he follows is that
prescribed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.l~
It should be obvious that the application in particular instances of all
these complementary and highly abstract human rights prescriptions can
be no automatic process in which the applier merely interprets the literal
words of a single text and maintains a putative fidelity to that texLI5 In
any particular instance an applier may be confronted with competing
claims by different parties about highly complex or obscure facts and is
commonly confronted not with a single prescription but with a vast body
of allegedly relevant prescriptions. The responsible performance of the
application function in such instances may require a whole sequence of
activities or choices, including: the exploration of the potential facts and
14. Hassan, The Word "Arbitrary" as Used in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
"Illegal" or "Unjust", 10 liARv. lNT'L L.J. 225 (1969). Candor compels diBclosure that thiB
young scholar was also one of my favorite students. In an article on The International Protec-
tion of Human Rights: An Approach to Interpretation, 19 BUFF. L. RE\'. 35 (1969), Mr. Hassan
does recommend a contextual approach to the problem of interpretation.
15. Newman, Natural Justice, Due Process, and the New International Covenants on
Human Rights: Prospectus, 1967 J. PUBLIC L. 274. See also Newman, Interpreting the
Human Rights Clauses of the UN Charter, 5 HUMAN RJGHTS J. 263 (1972). It is not our
intention to suggest that texts are unimportant-only that they require supplementation by
reference to many other features of the process of prescriptive communication. Sce McDou-
gal, The International Law Commission's Draft Articles Upon Interpretation: Textualit),
Redivivus, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 992 (1967).
16. The allusion is to Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice's eloquent, inspirational plea for fidelity to
texts. Fitzmaurice, Vae Victis or Woe to the Negotiators! }'our Treat)· or our "Interpretation"
of it?, 65 AM. J. lNT'L L. 358 (1971).
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their larger context; the exploration of the potential policies apparently
relevant to the provisional focus upon the facts; the characterization of the
facts and determination of their varying degrees of relevance; the selection
from among the potential policies of those to be applied and the detailed
relation of these policies to the facts regarded as relevant; and finally, the
formulation and projection of the decision, with indication· of measures
appropriate to securing conformity.t7 For an applier genuinely dedicated
to the clarification and implementation of the common interest, the nee
cessities of an informed and rational, yet still personal, choice must stalk
~very act in this sequence.
The tasks of exploring and clarifying potentially relevant policies within
the whole process of application are commonly regarded as especially com·
plex and open-ended. IX For the purpose of a more detailed examination of
these tasks and of considering possible intellectual procedures for their
improved performance, it is suggested that these tasks may be somewhat
more discriminatingly and precisely categorized in threefold fashion.
A. Ascertaining the Community Expectations Expressed in Particular
Prescriptions
This task requires a genuine effort to achieve the closest possible approx-
imation of the aggregate of effective general community expectations
about the content, authority, and control of alleged prescriptive communi-
cations. No other goal could be compatible with the conception that au-
thority comes from the members of a community and with demands for
the wide sharing of power. The adequate performance of this task requires
a disciplined, systematic survey and assessment of all features of the pro-
cess of communication and its context which may affect expectation. The
significance for community expectation of anyone feature of a prescriptive
process of communication is dependent upon its interrelations with all the
other features of the process.
B. Supplementing Incomplete and Ambiguous Communications
This task requires the remedying of the inevitable gaps and ambiguities
in particular prescriptions by reference to more general, basic community
policies about the shaping and sharing of values. In conventional presenta-
tions this task is sometimes described in terms of the exercise of "reason"
17. The main features of this process are indicated in McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman,
The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, in 1 THE FUTURE OF TilE INTEIlNA·
TIONAL LEGAL ORDEIl 73 (C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1969).
18. This point is extensively documented in M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & J. MILLEIl, TilE
INTEIlPIlETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: PRINCIPLES OF CONTENT AND
PROCEDUIlE (1967).
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or the invocation of analogies. Its adequate performance demands. how-
ever, the disciplined employment of a comprehensive set of procedures,
including at least: specification of each of the opposing claims about pre-
scription in terms of the interests sought to be protected and the particular
demands for authoritative decision; formulation of the different options
open to the relevant decision-maker or other evaluator, which may be more
extensive than the decisions demanded by the opposing parties; estimation
of the consequences of alternative choices among possible options upon the
aggregate inclusive interests of the general community and the exclusive
interests of the particular parties; and choice of the option which promises
to promote the largest aggregate long-term common interest, inclusive and
exclusive.
C. Integrating Particular Expectations with Basic Community Policies
This task requires a decision-maker or other evaluator who, recognizing
that he is responsible for the total policy of the community which he
represents or of which he is a member, will reject even the most explicit.
precisely-formulated expectations when they are inimical to basic, more
intensely-demanded community policies. The task is made authoritative
with respect to international agreements by the newly formulated constitu-
tive prescription about ius cogens. 19 The considerations which prompted
the making of this prescription for international agreements apply, how-
ever, no less cogently to the less deliberately formulated prescriptions of
customary law. The adequate performance of this task demands proce-
dures comparable to those recommended for supplementing expectations,
with explicit specification of the more intensely demanded general com-
munity policies and the deliberate rejection of any prescriptive intimations
that contravene these policies. Since the emerging human rights prescrip-
tions themselves largely embody our contemporary community's most in-
tensely demanded policies, occasion for the supercession of a human rights
prescription can be expected to be infrequent.
The important question now is whether it is possible to identify intellec-
tual strategies or procedures which might be employed to minimize the
arbitrariness and increase the rationality of all the various choices which
an applier or other evaluator must necessarily make. Some observers find
it impossible to specify goals for application, such as we have suggested
above, and, hence, despair of introducing meaning and order into any
imaginable principles of application. Other observers, underestimating the
difficulties inherent in the problem, prefer to cherish the illusion that they
19. Final Report of the Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties. arts. 53. 64. opened for
signature, May 23. 1969. U.N. Doc. NConf. 39/27. May 22. 1969. reprinted in 8 I~T'L L.
MATERIALS 679 (1969). This treaty is not yet in force.
HeinOnline -- 14 Va. J. Int’l L.  396 1973-1974
396 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 14:3
can secure certainty by the undisciplined contemplation of the verbal
texts, which, however important, are but one of the instruments of commu-
nication. 211 It is our brief that by the systematic and disciplined employ-
ment of a number of interrelated intellectual strategies it might be possible
both to reduce the arbitrariness and to increase the rationality of applica-
tion. The more important strategies we might recommend toward this end
would include at least the following: (1) the clear establishment of an
observational standpoint, in identification with the whole of mankind; (2)
the explicit postulation of a comprehensive set of overriding goal values;
(3) the specification of more detailed presumptive preferences with respect
to all values in community process; (4) the specification of presumptive
preferences about each major feature of constitutive process; and (5) the
systematic employment of a comprehensive set of principles of content and
procedure for the examination and appraisal of all relevant features of a
problem in application in its context. A brief exposition may suggest what
is entailed in each of these particular recommendations.
II. THE RECOMMENDED METHOD OF CLARIFICATION
A. The Establishment of Observational Standpoint
The applier or other evaluator should make himself as conscious as
possible of all the different communities, from global to local, of which he
is a member and upon which his choices must have unavoidable impacts.
His most appropriate identifications are with all these communities, con-
centric in their geographic reach and interpenetrating in their value pro-
cesses, and his primary concern should be that his choices take into ac-
count the aggregate consequences for all these communities and reflect
their common interests. The aspiration of an applier who represents a
community whose basic constitutive process projects a comprehensive
public order of human dignity-as is increasingly sought in the contempo-
rary human rights prescriptions-and who is himself genuinely committed
to this goal, should be to make his every particular application of authori-
tative prescription contribute to progress toward this goal. Such an applier
will recognize that, in a global interdetermination of all values, there is
indeed a human rights dimension to all interaction and decision, and will
make every effort to insure that such dimensions are effectively taken into
account in decision. This recommendation, it may require emphasis, is not
that a decision-maker assume the license to impose his own unique, idio-
syncratic preferences upon the larger community. It is, rather, a demand
that the decision-maker identify with the whole of the communities he
20. The varying views are collected in McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & MILLER, supra note 18, at 6
et seq.
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represents and that he make a systematic, disciplined effort to relate the
specific choices he must make to a clarified common interest, specified in
terms of overriding community goals, for which he personally can take
responsibiIity.21
The relevant perspective, that of identification with the whole of man-
kind engaged in a vast cooperative effort to enhance the protection of
human rights, has been well-stated in one of the best books on human
rights:
More and more, the world has come to recognize the validity of
the claim of the human personality to be heard in every decision
affecting the fate of man and to cast its decisive vote in the
council of nations. Pope John xxm spoke for all when he postu-
lated a set of international rules of conduct and conscience, which
rests on a conception of the universe in which the recognition of
the moral personality of man and his dignity and rights stand in
the center. In his celebrated encyclical Pacem in Terris of April
10, 1963, Pope John declared:
Like the common good of individual political
communities, so too the universal common good cannot be
determined except by having regard to the human person.
Therefore the public authority of the world community,
too, must have as its fundamental objective the recogni-
tion, respect, safeguarding and promotion of the rights of
the human person. . . .
Above all the clamor of differences which divide people, men
and women of all continents and of all latitudes and longitudes,
regardless of the diversity in their background and outlook, are
united in their quest for personal dignity and for the satisfaction
of their human rights and fundamental freedoms.:%
B. The Explicit Postulation of Basic Public Order Goals
The task of application might be made easier by the explicit postulation
of a comprehensive set of goal values and their systematic employment
through various interrelated skills in the detailed relation of community
prescriptions to particular instances of interaction. The task of calculating
the consequences of any particular application is, as a distinguished Amer-
ican legal philosopher has said, an "infinite" one if the calculator does not
operate with "discriminating" criteria of what consequences are "impor-
21. Elaboration is offered in McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, Theories About International
Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. Ir.-T'L L. 188 (1968).
22. M. MOSKOWITZ, THE POUTICS AND DYNAMICS OF HUMAN RJGlrrs 75, 76 (1968).
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tant." The insistent question for every applier or other evaluator is for
what basic policy goals he, as a representative of the larger community of
mankind and of its various lesser component communities, is willing to
commit himself as the primary postulates of public order for inspiring and
shaping the particular choices he has to make.
The goal values we recommend for postulation are of course those which
today are commonly described as those of human dignity, or of a free
society, and which are incorporated with varying degrees of completeness
and precision in reference in the many emerging human rights prescrip-
tions to which allusion has been made above. These prescriptions, as we
have seen, are formulated at many different levels of abstraction, and in
terms of many differing complementarities, both explicit and implicit; but
the basic thrust of the various prescriptions in sum is toward the greater
production and wider sharing of all human dignity values. Thus, the op-
portunity open to the responsible applier today is not that of an idiosyn-
cratic and private postulation, but rather that of an open and genuine
commitment to the rising common demands of peoples everywhere.
It may be emphasized, as already suggested, that the recommended
values of human dignity are not representative only of the exclusive, par-
ochial perspectives of particular segments of the larger community of man-
kind. When properly understood and accepted, these values admit of a
great diversity in the institutional practices by which they are sought and
secured; in different cultures and communities, very different institutional
practices may contribute to the shaping and sharing of the same values.
When overriding goals are accepted, creativity and diversity may be en-
couraged by the protection of a wide range of functional equivalents in
institutional practices.
It has been suggested by critics that the postulation of human dignity
values is utopian because state officials do not in practice accept these
values.21 It may be agreed that many of the institutional features of the
contemporary international arena do militate against effective human
rights implementation. In addition to these features, however, one must
consider the m')st deeply held and widely shared perspectives of the peo-
ples who constitute the ultimate source of effective power in the different
communities. We believe that value by value breakdown of the demands
and expectations of peoples would, as suggested above, reveal strong trends
toward an increasing consensus on the basic components of an interna-
tional bill of rights. In the long run it is these demands and expectations
23. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809,
848 (1935).
24. E.B. HAAS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ACTION 131 (1970). Professor Haas fails
to distinguish the observational standpoint of the scholar from that of the state official and
appears to assume that the perspectives ("consent") of state officials cannot be changed.
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which will provide the effective conditions for the enhanced international
protection of human rights.
It will be observed that we emphasize the postulation and clarification
of public order goals in contradistinction to their derivation. It is not by
faith and mere logical exercises that new knowledge can be acquired, but
rather by the systematic and disciplined exercise of relevant intellectual
skills.:!,; Peoples subscribing to very different styles in derivation and justi-
fication have long demonstrated, as we have noted, that they can cooperate
in the specification and promotion of the same human dignity values.
C. The Specification of Presumptive Preferences lL'ith Respect to Value
Processes
Both deprivations and fulfillments of human rights occur as integral
parts of the larger community processes in which all values are interdepen-
dent.2b The task of application might be aided if appliers and other evalua-
tors operated with comprehensive and detailed maps of their presumptive
preferences about the different features of the value processes comprised
within the larger community processes. The applier does an inadequate job
if he does not appraise any specific choice in the light of all relevant
community policies. "Unless:' as Harold Lasswell has written, "tentative
value judgments are reviewed in the context of a total conception of the
preferred form of social order, unnecessary inconsistencies and omissions
occur.":;
The more comprehensive and detailed specification of presumptive pref-
erences might extend beyond the general postulation of higher levels of
production and wide sharing in all value processes to an itemization value
by value and phase by phase within each value process. Such an itemiza-
tion might include the development of detailed preferences about each
phase of any particular value process which would put flesh and blood into
such formulations as the following::~
25. It is this which, contrary to Professor Haas' assertions (id.), distinguishes an approach
by postulation from a "natural law" approach.
26. In this type of reference we build of course upon the value and institutional categoriza-
tions of the cultural anthropologists. See B. MWNOWSKI. FREEDOM AND CI\1UZATlON (1944);
B. MAUNOWSKI. CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1926). The broad framework ofinquiry
we recommend is indicated in Lasswell, Tou'ard Continuing Appraisal of the Impact of Law
on Society, 21 RUTGERS L. REv. 616 (1967), reprinted in TilE 1..-\\\' SCHOOL OF TO!JORROW 87
(T. Cowan ed. 1967). See also H. LAssWELL, A PRE-VIEW OF POUC\' SCIENCES (1971); H.
LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY (1950).
27. Lasswell, Clarifying Value Judgment: Principles of Content and Procedure, 1 L'iQL1RY
87 (1958).
28. An earlier version of this outline appears in McDougal. Lasswell & Chen. Human
Rights and World Public Order: A Frameu'ork for Policy-Oriented Inquil)', 63 ~I. J. L'"T'L
L. 237 (1969).
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Outcomes
Achievement of an optimum aggregate in the shaping and shar-
ing of the value;
Access to a basic minimum of benefits;
Enjoyment of further benefits on the basis of merit and
contribution;
Participation
Widest possible access compatible with other overriding com-
munity values;
Freedom from discrimination irrelevant to merit;
Freedom to form and join groups;
Perspectives
Freedom to acquire demands for the value;
Opportunity to discover latent capabilities for participation;
Opportunity to acquire capabilities;
Opportunity to exercise capabilities;
Freedom to establish and change identifications;
Opportunity to achieve realism in expectations;
Situations
Freedom from interference in initiating and constituting institu-
tions;
The establishment and maintenance of specialized and non-
specialized institutions, adequate to maximize human poten-
tials;
Freedom of access to appropriate institutions;
Compulsory access when necessary to responsibility;
Freedom from deprivations disproportionate to crises;
Optimum adjustment of institutions in space (territorially and
pluralistically) and through time for the realization of purposes
above;
Base Values
Access to authoritative decision to defend and fulfill all rights;
Access to controlling value processes:
Basic minimum;
Equal access (protection against monopolization);
Opportunity for continuing accumulation of the value;
Special assistance to overcome handicaps in achieving access;
Strategies
Freedom to employ effective strategies in the shaping and
sharing of the value;
Preference for persuasive, rather than coercive, strategies;
Freedom from discriminatory strategies.
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If initial presumptive preferences of this order were applied to each value
process, and to each claim for human rights within each value process-as
itemized in Appendix I, "Claims Relating to the Process of Value Fulfill-
ment and Deprivation"-it might be possible to create the comprehensive
and detailed map that would assist in rational application. In particular
applications the presumptive preferences with respect to each particular
value process, or phase of such process, would, if basic goals in the protec-
tion of human rights are to be fulfilled, be given the utmost deference
compatible with aggregate achievement. The precise delineation of the
rights of any particular individual in any particular context would, how-
ever, always require-as the contemporary human rights prescriptions do
require-an infinitely delicate accommodation with the comparable rights
of other individuals and with the inclusive interests of all community
members.29
D. The Specification of Presumptive Preferences about Features of
Constitutive Process
The constitutive decisions of any community, global or lesser, are those
which establish and maintain its most comprehensive process of authorita-
tive decision: the decisions which identify the authoritative decision-
makers, project the basic community policies which are to be sought, es-
tablish appropriate structures of authority, allocate bases of power for
sanctioning purposes, authorize procedures for the making of decisions,
and secure the performance of all the different types of decision functions
(intelligence, promotion, prescription, innovation, application, termina-
tion, appraisal) necessary to the making and administering ofgeneral com-
munity policy. It is these decisions which determine the freedom, security,
and abundance of a community's public order, including the degree to
which human rights are promoted and protected or deprived, in all the
community's different value processes.S\I
The principal concern of the contemporary human rights movement in
relation to constitutive process has, unfortunately, been with either too
generalized a concept of "implementation" or too narrow a focus upon
isolated techniques designed to protect various particular rights. Any ra-
tional effort to improve implementation would, of course, extend to com-
prehensive inquiry about the whole global constitutive process of authori-
tative decision, considering in detail how participation, the specification
29. The familiar contraposition of "human rights" and "collective rights" would appear
to be a false one. When "collective rights" are given detailed semantic reference, they can
refer only to the rights of individuals. The relevant question is as to the compatibility of the
rights. "individual" or "collective," with criteria of human dignity.
30. Amplification of these concepts is offered in Lasswell & McDougal, Criteria for a
Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 362 (1971).
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of goals, the establishment of structures, the allocation of bases of power,
the performance of procedures, and the role of decision functions might be
changed for the better promotion and securing of demanded rights. The
point we would emphasize is, however, more fundamental: it is that a
human rights dimension is present, not merely in the flow of decisions
emerging from constitutive process for the protection of individual rights
in all the various value processes, but also in decisions about every aspect
of constitutive process. The most realistic effort to promote a better imple-
mentation of human rights must, accordingly, recommend policies appro-
priate to decisions about every phase of constitutive process for both the
global community and its component lesser communities.
The literatures of political thought, jurisprudence, and international law
offer a vast reservoir of policies relating to every phase of constitutive
process potentially appropriate for the better reflection and securing of
human rights.J1 Appendix II presents a highly impressionistic itemization,
which we are in the process of developing in more detail elsewhere, of some
of these inherited policies. The suggestion we make is that the quality of
application, and hence of implementation, might be greatly improved if
appliers made explicit their own more comprehensive conceptions of this
order.
E. Possible Principles of Content and Procedure In Guidance of
Application
The probability of maximizing the realization of the goals sought in
application might be increased if the various established appliers would
employ a comprehensive set of principles, both of content and procedure,
designed to guide their attention in a systematic manner to all features of
the context relevant to the rational performance of the different intellec-
tual tasks of application. Principles of content guide the choice of subject
matter relevant to evaluating the alternatives in policy open to a decision-
maker; principles of procedure offer agendas and techniques for bringing
pertinent content to the focus of a decision-maker's attention. The employ-
ment of these principles in application presupposes both the careful main-
tenance of the observational standpoint of the community representative
and continuous reference to perspectives embodying a detailed specifica-
tion of the goal values of human dignity. These more detailed specifica-
tions of human dignity perspectives will include, as sought to be illustrated
above, both the more general value preferences for community process as
a whole and the more specific features of the constitutive process for which
31. For a brief survey of some of these policies, with references to an immense literature,
see Lasswell & McDougal, Trends in Theories About Law: Comprehensiveness in Conceptions
of Constitutive Process, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1972).
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the applier takes responsibility.
The type of principle recommended may be illustrated briefly by refer-
ence both to principles of content and principles of procedure.X!
Principles of Content
The most general principle, that of contextuality, is that in performing
the tasks of application, preference should be given to alternatives that
have been considered and evaluated in the larger context of the processes
of prescription, claim, and application and of the factors affecting such
processes.
I. Principles relating to the prescribing process.
a. Ascertaining the prescription
(i) Give preference to the expectations shared by commu-
nicators and communicatees during the whole process of prescrip-
tion.
(ii) Develop principles which refer to every feature of the
process of prescription, indicating the presumptive relevance of
such features for shared expectations about the content, author-
ity, and control of alleged prescriptions.
b. Supplementing expectations
(i) Observe the expectations created by prescriptive com-
munications for gaps, ambiguities, and contradictions.
(ii) Remedy any inadequacies in prescriptive communi-
cations by reference to the postulated basic goal values of human
dignity (both public order and constitutive).
c. Integrating expectations
(i) Observe whether any alleged prescriptive communica-
tions contradict the postulated basic goal values of human dig-
nity.
(ii) Remove any contradictions by reference to the postu-
lated basic goal values of human dignity.
2. Principles relating to the process of claim
a. Since differences in types of controversies may affect
choice of relevant prescriptions, the supplementing of incomplete
prescriptions, and the integrating of prescriptions with basic
community policies, employ principles which relate different
types of controversies to the larger map of basic community poli-
cies.
b. Construct principles which categorize the different types of
32. These principles are being developed in more detail in a collaborative study \\ith
Professors Lasswell and Reisman.
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controversies in terms of the values affected. (In Appendix I we
offer an outline of claims about human rights which can be re-
lated to a comprehensive map of basic community policies.)
3. Principles relating to the process of decision
Employ principles which canvass every feature of the process of decision
for its potential relevance to recommended outcomes and policy effects.:~'
Principles of Procedure
1. The contextual principle
Employ procedures appropriately calculated to bring all relevant con-
tent to the focus of attention in the order best adapted to exhibiting relev-
ance. In appraisal of claims and in performance of all intellectual tasks
give priority to procedures which fully and systematically take the larger
context into account. Avoid a fragmented approach which rigidly fixes
upon a few features of the context. Although continuously engaging in
evaluation, suspend final judgment until examination of the whole of the
relevant context.
2. The principle of economy
Adjust the time and facilities devoted to application to the importance
of the values at stake in the controversy and to community policies.
3. The principle of manifest (provisional) focus
For a provisional focus begin with the manifest, articulated demands of
the parties themselves. For each party note the claims made about the
facts (value processes affected and sought to be protected), about relevant
prescriptions and other policies, and about appropriate decisions and mea-
sures in application.
On claims by states to derogate from human rights prescriptions because
of public emergency, for example, contrapose the assertions of the state
about necessity and proportionality with those of the individual (or his
representative) about the absence of necessity and proportionality.
4. The principle of clarified focus
Explore both precipitating events and context, independently of the
perspectives of the parties, from the standpoint of the disinterested ob-
server. Evaluate the different versions of potential facts and make an
independent characterization. Note the whole of the potentially relevant
prescriptions and the range of potential choices in decision.
33. The principles recommended here would be comparable to those outlined in M.
McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & J. MILLER, supra note 18, at 61.
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With respect to claims about derogation, for example, make a system-
atic, disciplined examination of all features of the context of alleged crisis
and of proposed (or actual) measures in derogation to achieve an indepen-
dent assessment of necessity and proportionality. It does not suffice, as
sometimes suggested, to regard these questions as matters of "fact," about
which nothing in general that is useful may be said.31
5. The principle of observing trends in past experience
Observe the successes and failures, in terms ofapproximations to general
community policies, that have previously been achieved on comparable
problems by invocation of the varying alternative prescriptions and by
alternatives among the options in application.
6. The principle of realistic orientation in factors affecting decision
a. Observe the factors in predisposition and environment that appear
to have affeQted past applications.
b. Appraise the probabilities of these and other factors affecting fu-
ture decisions on comparable problems.
7. The principle of observing the constraints of future probabilities
a. Construct alternative future probabilities in decision and decision
impact.
b. Estimate the relative costs and benefits, in terms of general com-
munity values, of the various alternatives in decision.
c. Calculate the probable net costs and net benefits of each option.
8. The principle of evaluating and inventing options in decision.
Relate all options to basic general community policies and choose the
option that will promote the largest net aggregate of common interest.
III. CONCLUSION
It is not my suggestion that any intellectual strategies, however system-
atically developed and carefully refined, can enable an applier to dispense
with a final creative choice in the relation of human rights prescriptions,
any more than of other prescriptions, to particular instances of human
interaction. The necessities for such a choice are inherent in the materials
with which he must work and the making of such a choice is his unique
community responsibility. What I do suggest is that the employment of
some such strategies as we have recommended, appropriately developed
and elaborated, might enable an applier better to know what options are
open to him and more rationally to relate his choice among such options
to the fundamental general community perspectives which today infuse
34. J.B.S. FAWCEIT, supra note 13, at 249, commenting on the Lawless case.
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the human rights prescriptions. Appropriate principles of content. making
reference to all the various processes of interaction, could assist by insuring
the systematic examination of all the relevant features of the context in
performance of the necessary intellectual tasks of specifying policies, not-
ing degrees of achievement in past decisions, determining conditioning
factors, estimating probable future developments and impacts, and ap-
praising the costs and benefits of different options in decision. Appropriate
principles of procedure, designed to make an economic use of all resources
at the applier's disposal, could assist by bringing this "content" informa-
tion to a central focus of attention in which every significant detail of the
context is appraisable in relation to all other such details, and whereby the
applier is afforded maximum opportunity for making rational choices. For
appliers genuinely dedicated to the common interest, the two kinds of
principles, employed in appropriate combination, might serve to minimize
the arbitrariness of choice and to establish a comprehensive and coherent
frame of reference for the more effective relation of particular choices in
application to the overriding goal values of an increasingly universal public
order of human dignity.
APPENDIX I
CLAIMS RELATING TO THE PROCESS OF VALUE FULFILL-
MENT AND DEPRIVATION
1. CLAIMS RELATING TO RESPECT
A. Claims relating to Outcomes





2. Claims to a basic equality in the enjoyment of all values, Le. freedom from
discrimination for reasons irrelevant to merit.
Race (color)
National, ethnic or social origin
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3. Claims for further rewards in respect for meritorious contribution (recogni-
tion, honor, reputation)
4. Claims for the protection of privacy
B. Claims relating to Participation
L Claims for participation in the shaping of respect
Individuals
Groups
2. Claims for participation in the sharing of respect
Individuals
Groups
C. Claims relating to Perspectil'es
L Claims to be free to acquire a demand for respect
(a) Claims for opportunity to discover latent capabilities for participa-
tion
(b) Claims for opportunity to acquire capabilities
(c) Claims for opportunity to exercise capabilities
2. Claims for freedom to establish and change identification
3. Claims for opportunity to achieve realism in expectations
D. Claims rl!lating to Situations
(I) Institutions specialized to respect
L Claims for freedom to initiate and constitute institutions specialized to reo
spect
2. Claims for freedom of access to institutions specialized to respect
(II) Institutions not specialized to respect
Claims for freedom of access to institutions not specialized to respect
(ill) Crisis
Claims that respect be proportionately accorded despite crises
E. Claims relating to Base Values
(I) Authoritative
Claims that the process of authoritative decision is available to defend and fulfill
respect
(II) Controlling
L Claims that participation in each of the other value processes is available to
defend and fulfill respect
2. Claims for special assistance to overcome handicaps not attributable to
merit
F. Claims relating to Strategies
1. Claims to be free from the employment of the diplomatic instrument for
deprivation of respect
2. Claims to be free from the use of the ideological instrument for depri\'ation
of respect
3. Claims to be free from the management of goods and services as a denial of
respect (e.g., forced labor, imprisonment for debt)
4. Claims to be free from use of the military instrument as a denial of respect
II. CLAIMS RELATING TO POWER
A. Claims relating to Participation
(I) Claims for individual participation
L Claims to be recognized as a person
2. Claims to be protected in external interactions (nationality)
HeinOnline -- 14 Va. J. Int’l L.  408 1973-1974
408 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 14:3





Participation in all other value processes
4. Claims not to be denied participation for reasons irrelevant to merit (race,
etc.)
(II) Claims for association in groups (freedom to establish and join groups)
1. Claims in relation to political parties
2. Claims in relation to pressure groups
3. Claims in relation to private associations
4. Claims in relation to protection for minorities
5. Claims to change rulers of groups (right of revolution)
6. Claims to constitute a new entity (self-determination)
7. Claims to be free from external coercion
B. Claims relating to Perspectives
1. Claims to be free (after exposure to adequate enlightenment) to acquire, or
not to acquire, a demand for power
(a) to discover latent capabilities for participation
(b) to acquire capabilities
(c) to exercise capabilities
2. Claims for freedom to establish and change identification
3. Claims for opportunity to achieve realism in expectations
C. Claims relating to Arenas
(I) Geographical
1. Claims for freedom of transnational movement





















Claims to continuation of rights
(III) Authoritative Institutions (freedom to establish internal constitutive process of
groups)
1. Claims to freedom to initiate and constitute institutions specialized to power
2. Claims to freedom of access to adequate institutions specialized to power
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(IV) Controlling Institutions
1. Claims for freedom to initiate and constitute institutions specialized to \'al-
ues other than power
2. Claims for freedom of access to adequate institutions specialized to values
other than power
(V) Crisis
Claims to receive a proportionate degree of public support despite crises (in secu-
rity, power, respect, enlightenment, well-being, wealth, skill, affection, and recti-
tude)
D. Claims relating to Base Values
(I) Authoritative
Claims that the processes of authoritative decision, at all community levels, be
available to defend and fulfill all rights
(II) Controlling
1. Claims that participation in each of the other value processes is available to
defend and fulfill all rights
2. Claims for special assistance to overcome handicaps
E. Claims relating to Strategies
1. 'Claims relating to the diplomatic instrument
(a) Claims to freedom to employ
(b) Claims to freedom from coercive employment
2. Claims relating to the ideological instrument
(a) Claims to freedom to employ
(b) Claims to freedom from coercive employment
3. Claims relating to the economic instrument
(a) Claims to freedom to employ
(b) Claims to freedom from coercive employment
4. Claims relating to the military instrument
(a) Claims to freedom to employ
(b) Claims to freedom from coercive employment
F. Claims relating to Outcomes
(I) General
1. Claims for a civic domain (freedom from both official and effective power)
2. Claims to freedom from arbitrary seizure and confinement (freedom from
arbitrary power of government)
3. Claims to widest possible sharing of power
(II) Particular
Claims that the community maintain and afford appropriate access to institutions
specialized to each of seven functions:
(a) Intelligence (access to information relating to decision process)
(b) Promotion (freedom to organize and participate in pressure groups
and parties)
(c) Prescription (voting)
(d) Invocation (open access and effectiveness)
(e) Application (fair trials, etc.)
(0 Termination (referendum, assertion of unconstitutionality)
(g) Appraisal (participation in commission of inquiry)
m. CLAIMS RELATING TO ENLIGHTENMENT
A. Claims relating to Outcomes
1. Claims to an optimum aggregate in the shaping and sharing of enlighten-
ment (gathering, disseminating, enjoying)
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2. Claims to basic enlightenment
3. Claims to additional enlightenment on merit
B. Claims relating to Participation
1. Claims to general participation in receiving and giving enlightenment
2. Claims to be free of restrictions for reasons irrelevant to merit (race, etc.)
3. Claims for group participation in opportunity to acquire and disseminate
knowledge
C. Claims relating to Perspectives
1. Claims for freedom to acquire the demand for enlightenment
2. Claims to be free from conditioning with regard to thought process
(a) Claims to be free from state conditioning
(b) Claims to be free from private conditioning
3. Claims to be free from distorted communications
4. Claims for disclosure of special interests
D. Claims relating to Situations
(I) Institutions specialized to enlightenment
1. Claims for freedom to initiate and constitute institutions of enlightenment
2. Claims for freedom of access to institutions of enlightenment
(II) Institutions not specialized to enlightenment
Claims for freedom of access to institutions not specialized to enlightenment
(III) Crisis
Claims that enlightenment not be denied disproportionately to crisis
E. Claims relating to Base Values
(I) Authoritative
Claims that the process of authoritative decision is available to defend and fulfill
participation in the enlightenment process
(II) Controlling
1. Claims that participation in each of the other value processes is available to
the extent necessary to enlightenment (no monopoly in governmental or
private sources)
2. Claims for special assistance
3. Claims for freedom to acquire and employ appropriate language
F. Claims relating to Strategies
(I) Singly
1. Claims for freedom in small group communication
2. Claims for freedom in access to and employment of mass communication
3. Claims for freedom in the assembly of appropriate resources for enlighten-
ment
4. Claims for freedom to employ the military instrument to preserve enlighten-
ment
(II) In Combination
Claims to freedom from coerced deprivation of enlightenment (censorship)
IV. CLAIMS RELATING TO WELL-BEING
A. Claims relating to Outcomes
1. Claims to an optimum aggregate in the shaping and sharing of well·being
2. Claims for the right to life
3. Claims to a basic minimum in safety, health, and comfort
4. Claims for additional opportunities in accordance with choice-the range of
choice: body form (cosmetic surgery); choice of sex; choice of organs (me-
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chanical and human transplantation); choice of children (number. sex and
other genetic characteristics)
5. Claims for progress toward optimum somatic and psychological development
through life
6. Claims to a merciful euthanasia
B. Claims relating to Participation
1. Claims for general participation in the realization of bodily and mental
health and development
2. Claims to be free of restrictions for reasons irrelevant to merit (race, etc.)
3. Claims for group survival and development (no genocide)
C. Claims relating to Perspectives
Claims for freedom to acquire the demand for life and its full de\'elopment
D. Claims relating to Situations
(I) Geographical
Claims for an environment that is conducive to survival and development
(II) Institutions specialized to well-being
1. Claims for freedom to initiate and constitute institutions specialized to well·
being
2. Claims for freedom of access to institutions specialized to well.being
(ill) Institutions not specialized to well·being
Claims for freedom of access to institutions not specialized to well·being
(IV) Crisis
Claims not to be denied well·being disproportionately to crisis
E. Claims relating to Base Values
(1) Authoritative
Claims that the process of authoritative decision is available to defend and fulfill
well-being
(II) Controlling
1. Claims that participation in each of the other value processes is available to
defend and fulfill well.being
2. Claims for special assistance
3. Claims to be a beneficiary of pertinent science and technology
F. Claims relating to Strategies







2. Claims for freedom from coercive strategies
3. Claims to be free to accept or reject medical sef\ice (right to die)
4. Claims for freedom to accept or reject transplantation and repair (surgical
intervention, drugs, communicative therapy. situation therap)·)
5. Claims to employ specified strategies in birth control (family planning, abor·
tion)
6. Claims for the employment of genetic engineering (artificial insemination.
incubation outside the body, choice of psychophysical pattern)
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V. CLAIMS RELATING TO WEALTH
[VOL. 14:3
A. Claims relating to Outcomes
1. Claims to the maintenance of high level of productivity (rising standard of
living)
2. Claims to a basic minimum of benefits from the wealth process (guaranteed
income, social security, abolition of poverty)
3. Claims to the enjoyment of benefits on the basis of contribution and merit
B. Claims relating to Participation
1. Claims for general participation in wealth-shaping and sharing (right to
work, right to invest and employ resources, right to enjoy)
2. Claims for freedom from restrictions irrelevant to capabilities for contribu·
tion (race, etc.)
3. Claims for freedom of association and group shaping and sharing of wealth
C. Claims relating to Perspectives
Claims for freedom to acquire (or reject) a demand to participate in the wealth
process
D. Claims relating to Situations
(1) Institutions specialized to wealth
1. Claims for freedom to initiate and constitute institutions specialized to
wealth
2. Claims for freedom of access to institutions specialized to wealth
(II) Institutions not specialized to wealth
Claims for freedom of access to institutions not specialized to wealth
(III) Crisis
Claims that wealth not be denied disproportionately to crisis
E. Claims relating to Base Values
(1) Authorative
1. Claims that the process of authoritative decision is available to defend and
fulfill wealth demands
2. Claims for a degree of protection in the employment of resources in the
wealth process
3. Claims to the continuing accumulation of assets
(II) Controlling
1. Claims that participation in each of the other value processes is available to
defend and fulfill wealth demands
2. Claims for special assistance
3. Claims to employ resources for productive purposes (claims for freedom from
wasteful use of resources)
4. Claims that resources are open to exploitation and development ("economic
self-determination," "permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and reo
sources")
F. Claims relating to Strategies
1. Claims for freedom to employ all relevant strategies in the shaping and
sharing of wealth
2. Claims to be free from coercive strategies
3. Claims to be free from discriminatory strategies (e.g., discriminatory wages)
4. Claims to be free from capricious and arbitrary management
VI. CLAIMS RELATING TO SKILL
A. Claims relating to Outcomes
1. Claims to an optimum aggregate in the acquisition and exercise of skills
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2. Claims for a basic minimum of skills relevant to effecth'e pnrticipation in
all value processes
3. Claims for additional acquisition of skill in terms of talent and motivation
B. Claims relating to Participation -
1. Claims for unrestricted opportunity to acquire and exercise socially accepta-
ble skill
2. Claims for opportunity to have latent talent discovered
3. Claims not to be denied opportunity to acquire and exercise skill for rell50ns
irrelevant to merit (race, etc.)
4. Claims that groups are to be accorded skill
C. Claims relating to Perspectives
Claims to acquire a demand for, and capability of, skill expression
D. Claims relating to Situations
(I) Institutions specialized to skill
1. Claims for freedom to initiate and constitute institutions specialized to skiJJ
2. Claims for freedom of access to institutions specialized to skill
(II) Institutions not specialized to skill
Claims for freedom of access to institutions not specialized to skill
(ill) Crisis
Claims that skill not be denied disproportionately to crisis
E. Claims relating to Base Values
(I) Authoritative
Claims that the process of authoritative decision is a\'ailable to defend and fulfill
participation in the skill process
(II) Controlling
1. Claims that participation in each of the other value processes is available to
the extent necessary to skill
2. Claims for special assistance
F. Claims relating to Strategies
1. Claims for exposure to a training of a content appropriate to a culture of
science and technology
2. Claims for exposure to strategies in training relevant to a culture of science
and technology (claims for exposure to good teaching)
3. Claims to be free from coercive strategies (other than those inherent in the
process of compulsory education)
4. Claims for exposure to a socialization process that enables the individual to
acquire the motivations and capabilities appropriate to the performance of
adult roles in value processes
VII. CLAIMS RELATING TO AFFECTION
A. Claims relating to Outcomes
1. Claims to an optimum aggregate in the shaping and sharing of affection
(loyalties, positive sentiments)
2. Claims to a basic minimum of love as a human being (that neCCS5ar)' for
individuals to acquire the motivations and capabilities to function effec-
tively in shaping and sharing values)
3. Claims for additional affection in terms of capability and contribution
B. Claims relating to Participation
1. Claims to give and receive affection
2. Claims for freedom from restrictions irrelevant to capabilities (race, etc.)
3. Claims to give and receive loyalty to groups of one's choice
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4. Claims for freedom of association
C. Claims relating to Perspectives
Claims for freedom to acquire (or reject) a demand to participate in the affection
process
D. Claims relating to Situations
(I) Institutions specialized to affection
1. Claims to initiate and constitute intimate and congenial personal relation-
ships
2. Claims for freedom of access to institutions specialized to affection (adop-
tion, legitimacy, proper spouse)
3. Claims for recognition of membership in specialized groups
(II) Institutions not specialized to affection
Claims for freedom of access to institutions not specialized to affection
(III) Crisis
Claims that affection not be denied disproportionately to crisis
E. Claims relating to Base Values
(I) Authoritative
Claims that the process of authoritative decision is available to defend and facili-
tate affection demand
(II) Controlling
1. Claims that participation in each of the other value processes is available to
defend and facilitate affection demand
2. Claims for special assistance (capability of loving and being loved)
F. Claims relating to Strategies
1. Claims for freedom in the cultivation of love and loyalty
2. Claims to be free from coercive strategies
3. Claims to be free from discriminatory strategies
VITI. CLAIMS RELATING TO RECTITUDE
A. Claims relating to Outcomes
1. Claims for the maintenance of an order in which individuals demand of
themselves and others that they act responsibly
2. Claims to a minimum opportunity to receive positive evaluation of rectitude
as a human being
3. Claims for movement toward a more perfect participation of all in responsi-
ble conduct
B. Claims relating to Participation
1. Claims for freedom to participate in the formulation and application of
standards of responsibility (norms of responsible conduct)
2. Claims for freedom from restrictions irrelevant to capabilities (race, etc.)
3. Claims for freedom of association for rectitude purposes
C. Claims relating to Perspectives
1. Claims for freedom to acquire a demand on the self to act responsibly
2. Claims for freedom to choose among justifications of responsible conduct
(secular and religious justifications, and empirical, transempirical, or meta-
physical justifications)
D. Claims relating to Situations
(I) Institutions specialized to rectitude
1. Claims for freedom to initiate and constitute institutions specialized to recti-
tude
2. Claims for freedom of access to institutions specialized to rectitude
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(II) Institutions not specialized to rectitude
Claims for freedom of access to institutions not specialized to rectitude
(III) Crisis
Claims that rectitude not be denied disproportionately to crisis
E. Claims relating to Base Values
(I) Authoritative
Claims that the process of authoritative decision is available to defend and facili-
tate freedom of choice in rectitude
(II) Controlling
1. Claims that participation in each of the other value processes is amilable to
defend and facilitate freedom of choice in rectitude
2. Claims for special assistance
F. Claims relating to Strategies
1. Claims for freedom to employ all relevant strategies in the pursuit of
rectitude
2. Claims to be free from coercive strategies
3. Claims to be free from discriminatory strategies
APPENDIX II
POSTULATED POLICIES RELATING TO WORLD
CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS
The aspiration should be to achieve a constitutive process which both rellects. and is
effective in securing, basic human dignity values. The different features of constituth'e pro-
cess require shaping in such a way as to establish and maintain a wide sharing of power and
an appropriate production and distribution of other values. When basic human dignit}· goals
are clarified, many varying institutional practices may be accepted in appropriate implemen-
tation of such goals. For purposes of illustration, a number of possible policies are noted \\ith
respect to each major feature of constitutive process.
I. PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKING
The overriding policy is that of universality: all who are affected by, or who can affect,
authoritative decisions should participate in the making of such decisions.
The complementary sub-goals of this basic policy are representativenCl;s and responsibil-
ity.
A. Representativeness
The wide sharing of power requires both pluralism and equality.
All individuals and groups who are affected by decisions should be represented in such
decisions, both functionally and territorially.
Participation in decision should be upon the basis ofequality in interest. without discrimi-
nations irrelevant to merit and contribution and without minorities being authorized to make
policies for the whole.
The individual human being should be accepted as an important participant in transna-
tional processes of authoritative decision.
B. Responsibility
All who can affect authoritative decision should be held accountable for responsible par-
ticipation in accordance with their capabilities.
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Participation may be withheld or limited in terms of capabilities and willingness to bear
the burdens of shared decision.
II. PERSPECTIVES
The constitutive perspectives appropriate to a public order of human dignity are directed
toward the clarification and protection of common interests (significantly affecting a11) and
the rejection of claims of special interests (destructive of common interests).
Common interests include:
(a) Inclusive interests (more than one participant significantly affected)
(i) Minimum order (the prevention of unauthorized violence and coercion)
(ii) Optimum order (the maximum possible shaping and sharing of all values)
(b) Exclusive interests (predominant effects upon one participant)
(i) Internal minimum order
(ii) Internal optimum order
The perspectives which establish the more detailed content of common interests may be
described in terms of demands, identifications, and expectations.
A. Demands
The relevant demands of community members extend to all the basic human dignity
values, whatever the preferred forms in categorization.
It should be observed that community members demand different values with differing
degrees of intensity, and account should be taken of these differing intensities in demand. A
"bill of rights" or ius cogens is emerging on the global level comparable to that enjoyed in
the more mature national communities.
B. Identifications
The identifications of established decision-makers, as of community members, extend in
many varying degrees to the larger community of mankind and its lesser component commun-
ities. For the better clarification and integration of common interest, an appropriate balance
should be sought for decision-makers in terms of culture, class, group membership, and
personality.
C. Expectations
Established decision-makers, again like community members, differ greatly in their ex-
pectations, or matter-of-fact assumptions, about the conditions under which demanded val-
ues can be secured. The realistic orientation of all in context requires unceasing effort to
improve structures and procedures for inquiry and communication.
III. ARENAS
Relevant policies relate to both establishment and access.
A. Establishment
The creation and maintenance of authoritative structures appropriate to optimum deci·
sion may be sought in terms of certain features.
1. Institutionalization
Balanced: adequate but not over-bureaucratized; organized and unorganizedj SPO-
cialized to particular functions and non-specialized.
2. Geographic range
Balanced between centralized and de-centralized; integrated in a way to take into
account the range and intensity of impacts within different areas.
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3. Temporal
Continuous, rather than sporadic; permitting an appropriate timeliness in decision.
4. Responsive to crises
Alert and appropriately anticipatory.
B. Access
1. Open
Available to all with interest.
2. Compulsory
With process running to all who affect public order.
IV. BASES OF POWER
The promotion of a public order of human dignity requires a pluralistic distribution of
both authority and effective control.
A. Authority
1. The rule of law should be extended to all interactions. There should be no honoring
of "political questions". The general community should not recognize a competence
in any particular community to protect special interests. destructive of common
interest.
2. The general community should determine the allocation between inclusive compe-
tence ("international concern") and exclusive competence ("domestic jurisdiction").
All aspects of human rights should be recognized as of international concern.
3. Inclusive decision-makers should be accorded the competence necCS-."lll')' to protect
inclusive interests.
4. Exclusive decision-makers should be accorded the competence necessary to protect
exclusive interests.
5. Conflicts between inclusive and exclusive competence, and different exercises of
exclusive competence, should be resolved by a disciplined, systematic examination
of the features of the context that affect interest.
B. Control
The controlling bases of power should be allocated in a way to make authority effective.
A presumption should be indulged in favor of a pluralistic distribution of all values. \\ith an
appropriate balancing between different territorial communities and between functional and
territorial groups.
V. STRATEGIES
Policies of human dignity will seek an appropriate integration ofall strategies (diplomatic,
ideological, economic, military), with a strong emphasis upon persuasion rather than coer·
cion. Coercion will be authorized only as necessary and proportionate for securing public
order. Procedures will be preferred which respect human dignity in detail-with no unneces·
sary violence, invasions of privacy, or other value deprivations. Similarly. priority \\ill be
given to procedures which are open, not covert or secret, and which have a maximum elTect
upon enlightenment, with an empathetic ceremonialization of the community values at stake.
Some of the policies relevant to the sequence of activities or procedures common to most
types of decisions may be indicated in tabular form:
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3. Characterization of facts and policies
Deliberate, reasoned assessment, employing contextual analysis in characterization
of alternative choices.
4. Communication






The culminating outcomes of constitutive process include both certain aggregate conse-
quences for public order and a continuous flow of particular types of decisions affecting public
order.
A. Aggregate Consequences
The design of a public order of human dignity should be to establish a constitutive process
which will culminate in outcomes having the following characteristics:
1. Rationality
The particular decisions emerging from constitutive process should in fact integrate
and secure common interests in the goal values of human dignity. Appropriate
account should be taken of both short-term and long-term goals and all important
community identifications.
2. Efficiency
The process should be maintained as economically as possible in its expenditure of
participants' resources in relation to goals.
3. Inclusivity
The decision outcomes should be made to embrace all participants and interactions
affecting public order and should be applied equally, without discriminations irrele-
vant to merit and contribution.
4. Comprehensiveness and integration
The process should employ all the necessary types of decisions, appropriately inte-
grated, in the degree necessary to secure the demanded public order.
B. Particular Functions (Types of Decisions)
The more important policies in relation to each type of decision may be conveniently
specified in tabular form:






2. Promotion (taking initiatives and mobilizing opinion toward particular policies)
Rational
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3. Prescription (establishing certain policies as authoritative and controlling for com-
munity)
Effective (establishing a certain stability in expectations about authorit), and
control)
Rational (gives effect to common rather than special interests; appropriately
balanced in the protection of inclusive and exclusive interests)
Inclusive (extends to all interactions affecting common interests)
Prospective
4. Invocation (preliminary characterization of particular e\'ents in terms of prescrip-
tions)
Timely (prompt, available, open)
Dependable (in characterizing facts)
Rational (responsive to common interests)
Non-provocative
Effective (in stimulating application)
5. Application (final characterization of particular events in terms of prescriptions)
Rational (in conformity with prescriptions in common interest)
Uniform (contextual; unbiased; independent of special interests)
Effective (put into controlling practice)
Constructive (contributes to prescription; mobilizes consensus toward polit), and
increases effectiveness)
6. Termination (putting an end to prescriptions and arrangements effected under them)
Timely (prompt; to inject the expectation that change can be carried on in ways
compatible with human dignity)
Comprehensive and dependable (in exploration of facts and policies)
Balanced (in characterization of facts and policies in relation to conservation and
change)
Ameliorative (minimizing destructive impact of change)
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Prescriptions Respect Power Enlightenment Well-Being Wealth Skill Affection Rectitude Values
Universal De- 1.2,4,6. 7.8.9,10,11 19,22,26.27 3.5,22.24 4.17.22,23. 27 16 18 20.22,27
clarution of 7.12 13.14,15,21 25 27(1) 28
Human Rights
International 2( 1).:3,4( \). 1(1).(3).2(2). 19.20 6.7.10 \{2l,8 23 18 21.22
Covenant 7,8.16,17, (:3),9,11.12
on Civil and 24(1 ).25, 26. 13.14.15,
Political 27 24(2),(3).25.
Rights 27






European :3.4.8.14 5.6.7.13.16 10. 1st prot.•2 2.3.4. 4. 12 9 11
Convention 1st prot .•:3. 1st prot .• 1
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